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Abstract 
The Intervention with Microfinance for AIDS and Gender Equity (‘IMAGE’) combines 
microfinance, gender/HIV training and community mobilisation in South Africa. A trial 
found reduced intimate-partner violence among clients but less evidence for impact on 
sexual behaviour among clients’ households or communities. This process evaluation 
examined how feasible IMAGE was to deliver and how accessible and acceptable it was 
to intended beneficiaries during a trial and subsequent scale-up. Data came from 
attendance registers, financial records, observations, structured questionnaires (378), 
and focus-group discussions and interviews (128) with clients and staff. Gender/HIV 
training and community mobilisation were managed initially by an academic unit (‘linked’ 
model) and later by the microfinance institution (‘parallel’ model). Microfinance and 
gender/HIV training were feasible to deliver and accessible and acceptable to most 
clients. Though participation in community mobilisation was high for some clients others 
experienced barriers to collective action, a finding which may help explain lack of 
intervention effects among household/community members. Delivery was feasible in the 
short-term but both models were considered unsustainable in the longer term. A ‘linked’ 
model involving a microfinance institution and a non-academic partner agency may be 
more sustainable and is being tried. Feasible models for delivering microfinance and 
health promotion require further investigation.
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Introduction 
 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) typically provide small loans to poor women to support 
income-generating activities which can promote health through poverty reduction and 
female empowerment.[1-5] Many believe that combining microfinance with health 
promotion such as health education and community mobilisation (CM) is a promising 
approach to maximising health gains [6-9]. However, many MFIs emphasise 
specialisation in credit delivery, arguing that providing additional services might 
undermine financial sustainability.[10, 11] Evidence to inform these debates is lacking. 
Little is known about the effects of combining microfinance with health promotion, about 
the feasibility of delivering such programmes or their accessibilty and acceptability to 
clients. 
  
Poverty, entrenched gender inequalities and lack of community cohesion support high 
levels of intimate partner violence (IPV) and HIV transmission in rural South Africa.[12] 
The Intervention with Microfinance for AIDS and Gender Equity (IMAGE) combines 
microfinance, gender/HIV-awareness training (Sisters for Life, SFL), and CM in an 
attempt to tackle these health issues in this setting [4]. Details of the intervention 
components are provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
We conducted a cluster-randomised trial of IMAGE from 2001-2004 and subsequently 
scaled-up delivery during 2005-2007. We collected data on health outcomes during the 
trial and have collected process data throughout, guided by a conceptual framework 
[13]. During the trial process data were principally intended to supplement outcome data 
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by examining fieldstaff’s and participants’ perspectives on the intervention and exploring 
possible causal pathways. As scale-up commenced we decided to collect further 
retrospective data on delivery during the trial as well as prospective process evaluation 
data from managers, fieldstaff and clients.[14] This new data collection occurred during 
2005-2007. 
 
In the trial IMAGE was associated with a significant reduction in IPV and sexual risk 
behaviour among IMAGE clients but there was little evidence of an impact on condom 
use or HIV incidence among young people in clients’ households or communities [4, 15, 
16]. This paper explores the feasibility of IMAGE delivery and the accessibility and 
acceptability of IMAGE for intended clients [17]. Feasibility refers to the practicality of 
delivering the intervention as intended, accessibility to whether the intervention reached 
and fully involved intended clients and acceptability the extent to which clients found 
participation satisfactory.[17] We discuss the relevance of our findings to debates about 
the merits of ‘linked’ and ‘parallel’ models of inter-sectoral collaboration [18]. We also 
consider whether our findings on process help explain the outcomes observed in the 
IMAGE trial and their relevance for potential replication of IMAGE in other settings. 
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Methods 
Setting 
IMAGE was delivered in South Africa’s impoverished but rapidly developing Limpopo 
province.[19, 20] An established non-profit organisation, the Small Enterprise 
Foundation (SEF), delivered microfinance while the Rural AIDS and Development Action 
Research (RADAR) programme of Witwatersrand University initially delivered SFL and 
facilitated CM. The IMAGE trial enrolled 430 female clients in 10 loan centres from four 
villages through one SEF branch (A). Following this, the scale-up phase recruited over 
3000 clients from 115 villages (Figure). Scale-up initally expanded to clients who had 
been recruited to microfinance in Branch A but had not yet received the SFL or CM 
components. Delivery of SFL and CM to clients of a further SEF branch (B) subsequently 
began in early 2006.  As will be discussed further below, during the trial IMAGE used a 
‘linked’ delivery model [18], with staff from the two specialist organisations delivering 
services to the same clients. During scale-up, a ‘parallel’ delivery model [18] was tried, 
where both sets of staff were, to some extent, managed by one organisation (SEF). 
 
Figure here 
 
Data collection 
We conducted a multi-method process evaluation drawing on nine data collection 
modules, the timing of which are shown in the Figure. Throughout the trial (2001-2004), 
registers were kept to provide data on recruitment, dropout and attendance of the 
intervention to examine accessibility. During this period we explored intervention 
feasibility and acceptability via qualitative data from researchers’ notes on 134 hours of 
observation of intervention delivery covering the full SFL curriculum in the first four loan 
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centres enrolled, intervention provider diaries (n=4), focus-group discussions with clients 
(n=16) and semi-structured interviews with clients who dropped out of the programme 
after completing a loan cycle (n=19). We also later (2005-2006) conducted retrospective 
interviews with a convenience sample of trial clients (n=15). Client year-2 follow-up 
questionnaires conducted primarily during 2004 provided quantitative data on 
acceptability by examining participation and satisfaction in SFL sessions, recruitment of 
‘natural leaders’ and participation in CM. Response rate for these questionnaires was 
87.9% (378/430 clients interviewed). 
 
During scale-up (2005-2007), we used semi-structured interviews to explore views on 
feasibility of delivery during the trial (retrospectively) and scale-up (prospectively), 
conducting 7 interviews with RADAR managers (5 individuals), 16 interviews with SEF 
managers (12 individuals), 33 interviews with RADAR fieldstaff (10 individuals) and 14 
interviews with SEF fieldstaff (14 individuals), thus sampling all providers with significant 
contact with the intervention. In 2006 we also conducted semi-structured interviews with 
22 scale-up clients randomly selected from client lists covering both branches. In the 
scale-up phase, resources were not available to conduct client surveys on accessibility 
or acceptability. Finance monitoring systems provided data on loan repayment. All 
research participants gave informed consent for their participation. All semi-structured 
interviews were conducted in private at a location convenient to the participant and 
normally lasted 45-60 minutes. Questionnaires were conducted in similar settings and of 
a similar length though covered a broader range of issues many of which are not 
discussed here. Ethical approval was granted by ethics committees at the London 
School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine and the University of the Witwatersrand. 
 
Data analysis 
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Interview guides were designed in English. Client and fieldstaff interview guides were 
translated into the local language (Sepedi) and then back-translated into English to 
identify and resolve translation issues. Interviews with managers were conducted in 
English. Qualitative data were transcribed verbatim from digital recordings or other 
formats and, where necessary, translated independently by two researchers from Sepedi 
to English. Transcripts were analysed by developing a text coding structure in N6 (QSR 
International).[21] Initial codes were determined by our research questions with two 
researchers coding the transcripts.[22] Transcripts were then coded a second time and 
each researcher developed codes inductively from the data. In the tradition of grounded 
theory, close attention was paid to making ‘constant comparisons’ to challenge the 
analysis and develop further theoretical insights.[23].Thus, our analysis incorporated the 
‘top-down’ structure of research questions and the ‘grounded’ voices of informants.[24]  
 
Quantitative indicators of accessibility and acceptability were analysed using Stata 9 
(STATACorp, TX). Attendance at each of 10 SFL sessions was recorded for all 430 
clients included in the trial [4], thus data on 4300 client-sessions were potentially 
available and data were actually available on 3986 of these. Monthly dropout from the 
programme was calculated as the proportion of clients completing loan repayments each 
month who did not apply for a new loan [25]. Statements regarding acceptability of 
IMAGE to clients were coded on a four-point scale and distributions of client responses 
are presented here.  
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Results 
How feasible was IMAGE to deliver? 
Project initiation 
 
Interviews with SEF and RADAR managers revealed that RADAR initiated the linked 
partnership, co-ordinated funding arrangements and led the design of SFL and CM. SEF 
came to the partnership with experience of successfully delivering microfinance. Despite 
previous reluctance to engage in collaborations SEF managers were keen to collaborate 
with RADAR. This was in part because SEF was becoming more financially stable, but 
also because SEF managers were increasingly concerned about HIV/AIDS among their 
clients and staff. Further, SEF managers were impressed by RADAR and were holding 
some funds to address HIV/AIDS but had no plans for these. SEF saw the proposal as 
low-risk since RADAR would manage the new components (quote 1), and because the 
programme could be implemented in a new branch (A), the establishment of which could 
draw on the HIV/AIDS funding. Importantly, RADAR also did not propose to make any 
major changes to SEF’s delivery model (quote 2).  
[1] The cost was a big issue. That was the main issue. And we 
realised that it would not add any cost to our program, that all the 
people that will be involved [SEF and SFL staff] would be fully paid 
from [RADAR]. (SEF manager) 
 
[2] We did not want to disrupt SEF’s core activities- microfinance is a 
tough business so we didn’t want to disturb what they were doing and 
we just wanted to make sure that our relationship with them was 
smooth. (RADAR manager) 
 
Management and implementation during the trial 
During the trial, RADAR managed SFL and CM. Four trainers (all women, one openly 
living with HIV) were recruited and trained by an external consultant. This was intensive 
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and focused on faciliatation skills and reflection about one’s own circumstances followed 
by practice sessions (quote 3). Trainers found all these of value. 
[3] It is knowing that as a trainer you have to present very well, we 
have to be presentable, you have to be at the side of the flip 
chart…talk loudly…it was very stressful because we didn’t know 
what to do. [ … ] The training was so intense. It had everything to do 
with the sessions and everything to do with every faculty of your life. 
You had to be very aware of yourself before you could actually 
educate someone else. (SFL field staff) 
 
Ten SFL sessions were delivered in each of the ten loan centres. Selected women from 
each loan-centre were then identified by peers as ‘natural leaders’ (n=37) and were 
trained to lead their centres in CM to address priorities identified by clients. Natural 
leaders were expected to have actively participated during SFL sessions and have good 
interpersonal and problem-solving skills, although the selection process was determined 
by clients and differed between centres. Interviews with clients and fieldstaff revealed 
that CM unfolded in two ways during the trial: individual information-sharing and 
collective action. Individual information-sharing (e.g. telling one’s children about HIV and 
safer sex) was widespread, whereas collective action ( e.g. formation of a a rape 
committee, workshops on HIV, various marches) was more limited. Reasons for this are 
discussed later. 
 
SEF managed and successfully implemented the microfinance programme. During the 
trial unrepaid debt from ‘Branch A’ totalled less than 100USD from some 290,000USD 
disbursed. Microfinance performance in the trial was considered good even by SEF’s 
high standards. Managers reported that SEF fieldworkers working on IMAGE were 
among the highest performing across SEF. Their collaboration with SFL was suggested 
as one possible reason for this success, though it was recognised this was difficult to 
prove (quote 4).  
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[4] Every year we do award the best [microfinance field-staff]. It is a 
very competitive award and all [the fieldworkers] from [Branch A] 
came first. I think it was unbelievable and actually remarkable. I think 
the fact that they came first was related to the fact that they were part 
of the IMAGE project. I do not know whether it was something that 
they were doing on a day to day basis or was it something that had to 
do with their personalities or their own abilities. (SEF manager) 
 
SEF and SFL managers cited several factors as promoting successful delivery during 
the trial. These included: RADAR garnering SEF management support by raising 
awareness of the inter-relationship of poverty, IPV and HIV among clients; intensive 
training for SFL staff provided by an expert consultant; and. on-going support for trainers 
provided by RADAR management. One challenge during this phase was that SFL 
trainers had access to infrastructure support in the form of office computers and a team 
car which created tensions with SEF staff who used public transport and saw working 
conditions as somewhat unequal. 
 
Intervention management and delivery during scale-up 
Following the trial, management interviews showed that enthusiasm for IMAGE led the 
partners to plan the scale-up. RADAR managers felt long-term service delivery was 
outside their remit so the organizations decided to explore SEF managing SFL and CM 
in parallel with microfinance in the scale-up (quote 5).  
[5] I think SEF would have been quite happy for us to continue [this 
way, but] it makes it less replicable in other African settings. For 
example, you won’t always have a RADAR there so all sorts of things 
were raised by both of us and we were saying “no, in the scale-up 
let’s try and keep it within SEF.” (RADAR manager) 
 
However, SEF’s core mission of financially sustainable credit delivery remained central 
so that a complex and evolving management structure emerged. SEF was responsible 
for management and performance appraisal of SFL staff, while RADAR administered 
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salaries and supported recruitment, training, mentoring and monitoring of trainers. A 
former trainer managed the SFL team and championed IMAGE within SEF, while a SEF 
manager coordinated SFL with SEF’s core business. Because of earlier tensions 
regarding differences in working conditions, policies of SEF and SFL fieldstaff were 
aligned (quote 6) and various activities were undertaken to promote collaboration in the 
field (e.g. the SEF managing director facilitating joint workshops).  
[6] For me one of the things is that we have got to see if we can get 
the productivity of the [SFL] training up. If we are going to have the 
integration thing then we have got to have the organisational cultures 
have got to be close, and I worry that they are not. (SEF manager) 
 
Overall the SFL programme continued to be delivered successfully as the team 
expanded to include ten SFL fieldstaff. New recruits were expected to have relevant 
experience, so requiring less training and support. Training of new SFL fieldstaff was 
carried out by existing SFL trainers and focused less on personal reflection. The full 
programme of SFL sessions was delivered in both branches with minor changes to 
content. In ‘Branch A’ CM increasingly focused on individual information-sharing and 
trainers spent less time facilitating it because of their challenging workloads. In ‘Branch 
B’ CM was not implemented immediately in all centres on account of low attendance 
resulting from an unauthorised change by SEF fieldworkers to the way clients repaid 
loans. 
 
The parallel management model was severely tested during scale-up. At times staff were 
unclear whether SEF’s role was to liaise with or manage the SFL team. These difficulties 
were compounded by staff turnover and illness, and the attendance problems in ‘Branch 
B’. Uncertainties emerged regarding the most appropriate division of responsibilities in 
the partnership and these negatively affected SFL staff morale (quote 7). 
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[7] So we are supposed to be part of SEF but we are not clear how 
we are going to fit into it. Because we just know that it is going to be 
part of the branch somehow. It is going to seem like we are going to 
work for SEF, but as different departments. (SFL field staff) 
 
Despite these challenges, SEF and RADAR managers remained enthusiastic about the 
combined intervention and were committed to future work as the scale-up drew to a 
close. However, the parallel model used during scale-up was deemed unfeasible for 
longer-term work (quote 8). Managers expressed a preference for a different type of 
linked model, with a newly established service delivery organisation to be responsible for 
acquiring external funding, employing trainers and delivering SFL and CM (quote 9). 
[8] I think the more we worked with SEF, the more they felt they need to 
concentrate on what they do best. And [SEF management] felt that 
[they] want SFL to work with the women but [don’t] want to manage it. 
(RADAR field-staff) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How accessible and acceptable was IMAGE for intended clients? 
 
Accessibility and acceptability of SFL 
Attendance at SFL sessions was compulsory for loan recipients and thus dependant on 
recruitment and retention of women for microfinance. Registers showed that 430 women 
were recruited to the trial in 15 months as planned (table 2). As intended, these women 
were mostly over 35 years of age, were often heads of very poor households, and had 
limited education and multiple children (table 2). During scale-up at least 3000 
microfinance clients were involved in IMAGE (Figure). 
 
[9] So we have made the decision that ideally Sisters for Life should go 
into a separate NGO. We would still like to carry on in very much the 
same way we were doing in the trial [...] The integration definitely did 
not work. It is not a question. So will it work [if we are not managing 
SFL]. We believe so. (SEF manager) 
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Table 2 here 
 
During the first 18 months of the trial SEF records showed that dropout from 
microfinance was 11.1%, lower than SEF’s overall average (16.2%), although later the 
rate approached this average. Cumulatively, 134/428 clients (31.3%) surveyed at two-
year follow-up were no longer SEF members with main reasons for drop-out cited in 
interviews (quote 10) and questionnaires being trouble keeping up with repayments 
(37.3%) and death or illness in the household (16.4%). Only 4 (3.0%) dropouts cited the 
added SFL sessions as the reason.  
 
 
 
 
Registers showed that clients attended a median of 8/10 SFL sessions (interquartile 
range 5-10). Of all client-sessions on which data were available 2790/3986 (70.0%) were 
attended, 532 (13.4%) were missed due to non-attendance by current members, while 
277 (7.0%) were not attended due to individuals having left SEF and 387 (9.7%) due to 
individuals not yet having joined by that session. Attendance was lowest among women 
under 35 years of age who were most likely to drop out of the programme (table 2). 
Although quantitative data for attendance during scale-up is not available, qualitative 
data suggest overall patterns of attendance were similar. The reliance of SFL on 
successful microfinance functioning was highlighted when attendance at ‘Branch B’ was 
reduced by changes to the way that loans were repaid. 
 
Clients valued SFL, particularly the focus on communication, new information, social 
support and increasing confidence (quote 11 and table 3). 
[10] Because of poverty I used the loan meant for business to buy 
food, pay school fees and uniforms for children …and ended up with 
no money to buy stock. (Client)  
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[11] My children are beginning to understand me better and I now 
know how to live with them peacefully. They slowly are opening up. 
Hence I am grateful of health talks because they have helped me. My 
children are listening to me. (Client) 
 
Table 3 here 
 
SFL trainers were considered highly skilled (table 3). Only a minority of clients expressed 
concerns in interviews about sessions being too long, content being inappropriate or 
confusing, trainers being too young or SFL being compulsory (quote 12).  
[12] At some point I even told the facilitators that I did not join SEF for 
health education but for money. “Where does all this health education 
stuff come from?”, I asked. (Client) 
 
SFL trainers outlined factors that they considered influenced clients’ satisfaction with the 
programme. These included recruiting trainers locally so they understood clients’ lives 
and ongoing mentoring which enabled personal reflection and helped them connect with 
clients. A shift to less intensive mentoring by senior trainers (rather than external 
consultants) may have contributed to a reported reduction in trainer morale at certain 
points in the scale-up. Interviews with scale-up clients The perception that SEF 
fieldworkers supported SFL was also important and engaging both groups of staff in joint 
activities helped promote collaboration. During the trial, enthusiasm for the SFL 
programme was occasionally undermined by SEF clients being unaware that SFL and 
CM were a compulsory condition of membership. During scale-up, clients were clearly 
informed about both programmes when they joined.  
 
Acccessibility and Acceptability of CM 
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Structured interview data showed that women who took part in the ‘natural leaders’ 
training were most often 35-44 years of age and were more educated than average 
(table 2). Focus group discussions showed that this training was a source of confidence 
for those clients who took part (quote 13), but barriers such as sickness, constraints from 
husbands, childcare and the pressures of running a business meant that some women 
regarded as potential ‘natural leaders’ were unable to participate (quote 14).  
[13] The power that those women have after being identified as 
Natural Leaders; they went into training and I mean they were very 
different – that week changed them quite a lot. And I have seen them 
in action in the centre meetings after they return from the training. 
(Client) 
 
[14] Client #1 (older): I have recently had an operation and I think it 
is not going to be healthy for if I expose myself for winds out there. 
The winds will make me sick. Another thing is I am taking care of my 
school-going children.  
Client #2 (younger): I am staying with my husband. Unfortunately I 
cannot go.  
Client #3 (older): I would love to but I have a problem because I will 
have [to get] someone who can help to sell my stuff so that when we 
get back I will be able to repay my loan. 
 
In the structured interviews most clients reported that they participated in CM (table 3), 
and acts of individual information-sharing were widespread (quote 15).  
[15] As parents we were not taught to talk about sexual matters with 
our children. But the scourge of the virus is challenging every parent 
to open up and talk. It is difficult but it is something we have to face 
head on. As women and mothers and grandmothers we have the 
responsibility to protect our children against the virus. (Client) 
 
However, barriers to widespread participation in collective action were noted in 
qualitative data. Some ‘natural leaders’ were proactive, while others required ongoing 
support from SFL trainers over 6-9 months to help plan collective action (quote 16). 
Significant barriers limiting clients’ ability to participate included: other family and 
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community responsibilities; lack of monetary incentives to participate in collective action; 
need to prioritise running a business (quote 17); social pressure for privacy and 
‘respectability’; and participants’ low status in the community associated with their 
extreme poverty. These barriers may also have limited the wider impact of CM. In the 
trial it was noted that only 40/1182 (4.4%) young people in intervention communities 
identified “SEF, RADAR or Sisters for Life” as an important source of information about 
HIV/AIDS. 
[16] Well, you have to empower them. If you do everything for them, 
they get used to the fact that you do it. And if you don’t pitch, they 
say, “Oh [SFL fieldstaff]’s not here.” But if you empower them to go 
ahead without you… means, if you go to a meeting, make sure they 
contribute more than you do. (RADAR fieldstaff) 
 
[17] [Community mobilisation] takes us lot of time and energy to do it. 
Health education is very good but it cost us a lot if we are expected to 
go out and teach other people. We can teach our children and friends 
but I find difficult that I have leave my business and run around. 
(Client) 
 
In ‘Branch A’, CM occurred in the scale-up much as it had in the trial with more focus on 
individual rather than collective action. However, in ‘Branch B’, CM was delayed as a 
result of the problems with microfinance, and it was decided that CM would commence 
only with the strongest centres in this Branch.  
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Discussion  
Summary of findings 
We conclude that it is feasible to deliver gender/HIV training and CM alongside 
microfinance with impoverished clients without undermining microfinance delivery or 
repayment. Our evaluation also suggested contextual factors that supported successful 
delivery of these interventions. IMAGE was delivered by an MFI and an academic unit. A 
linked delivery model worked well during the trial during which microfinance and SFL 
proved feasible to deliver and accessible and acceptable to clients. However, during CM, 
collective action was less pronounced than information-sharing and this component did 
not appear to have the community-wide reach that was intended. Cultural norms, social 
marginalisation and women having a variety of other responsibilities were key barriers. 
Providers of interventions involving CM need to have realistic expectations of the 
potential limitations of this approach. During scale-up, the intervention was again largely 
delivered successfully. The MFI took on management of the intervention through a 
parallel model because the linked model involving an academic partner was not 
considered sustainable. Management ambiguities in the new model caused challenges 
as well. Thus, while both linked and parallel models functioned adequately neither was 
considered feasible long-term. A new model involving linkage with a non-academic 
organization will be tried in the next phase of work.  
 
 
Limitations 
 
We attempted to collect quantitative data on accessibility and acceptability from all trial 
clients and were able to follow-up 87.9% of these. However the views of those who were 
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not interviewed may have differed from those who were. We were not able to assess 
quantitatively the accessibility or acceptability of training or CM during the scale-up 
phase, and time restrictions meant we were not able to document fully the delayed roll-
out of CM through ‘Branch B’. Further, although all programme staff were interviewed, 
qualitative interviews in both phases were conducted with a small, albeit random, sample 
of clients whose views may have been unrepresentative of the majority. Interviews might 
also have focused on problems more than successes and these may be 
overemphasised in our analysis. Our detailed observation of intervention delivery 
focused on the first four centres recruited during the trial. The experience of these 
centres might also not have been representative since a great amount of energy went 
into refining the intervention during this phase. However, these centres also highlighted 
many problems with intervention delivery that were later resolved.  
 
Implications for research 
 
Our finding that the microfinance and training components were largely delivered as 
planned, with high levels of client satisfaction and participation, lends plausibility to the 
outcome of reduced IPV and sexual risk behaviour among direct intervention 
recipients.[4, 26] This supports previous work where we have documented pathways 
through which impacts might have been achieved [16, 27]. We found some evidence 
that contrary to the concern that implementing the combined IMAGE intervention might 
negatively influence microfinance performance, SEF staff working on IMAGE 
outperformed other SEF staff. Future research should clarify the potential synergies 
between health and development projects. 
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The microfinance and gender/HIV training components of IMAGE did not aim directly to 
reach young people. CM was intended to reach young people indirectly, via clients 
engaging in information-sharing and collective action. The indirect method for involving 
youth, together with our finding of significant barriers to collective action for some IMAGE 
clients, may help explain why the IMAGE trial found little evidence of effects on condom 
use and HIV incidence among young people in clients’ households and communities. 
Changes in condom use among household members were hypothesised primarily 
through the combined influence of changes in the household economy and a process of 
diffusion from direct clients,[28] which may have been overly-ambitious. While 
information-sharing and increased communication between IMAGE clients and young 
people came to be seen as an important aspect of CM [4, 29], this may not have been 
sufficient to instigate sexual behaviour change over a short follow-up period. Finally, 
while the intervention met its target of enroling 10-20% of eligible households in a village 
this may have been insufficient to generate community-wide effects, particularly where 
those targeted where among the very poorest and in many cases most socially 
marginalised members of their communities. In south Asia, where indirect effects of 
microfinance on contraceptive use have been observed, nearly half of village 
households enrol in the programme.[28]  
 
Implications for policy 
 
Regarding IMAGE’s potential to be replicated in other settings, it was important that the 
partnership involved a successful and financially sustainable microfinance organisation 
working in a developing economic environment. Other attempts by HIV/AIDS 
researchers to partner with microfinance and offer credit alongside other activities have 
been less successful [30, 31]. Reasons for the failure of these projects remain unclear 
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but may include the stagnant economic climate in Zimbabwe (both projects cited) and 
the targetting of young women at high-HIV-risk who may not make optimal microfinance 
clients. The decision not to change SEF’s microfinance delivery model appears to have 
been key in supporting the delivery of IMAGE, although, as described above, the fact 
that young people were under-represented likely contributed to the lack of overall impact 
on HIV-risk among this group. 
 
IMAGE employed a linked delivery model in the trial, moved to a parallel model during 
scale-up and finally settled on a linked model with a non-academic partner for future 
work. Within the microfinance literature, the parallel model has received more attention 
than the linked model [32]. Some practitioners even argue that a ‘unified’ model, 
involving a single staff-member delivering both credit and education, is preferable to both 
because linked and parallel approaches are inherently unsustainable due to grant 
dependency.[18] IMAGE’s linked model allowed components to be delivered by 
specialised staff with long health education sessions based on clear theoretical 
approaches [33]. However, the significant input required meant that neither an academic 
unit nor a specialised MFI were prepared to take on management. Interestingly, two 
major MFIs have recently launched linked model programs after many years of using 
unified and parallel approaches [34]. Future research is needed to demonstrate the 
extent to which these linked models are indeed sustainable and of high-quality.  
 
Conclusion 
The IMAGE study was a rare attempt to design and rigorously evaluate a complex 
intervention involving microfinance and health promotion components in a low-income 
setting. Our process evaluation is intended to complement the outcome evaluation and 
maximise learning from the trial and subsequent scale-up. We have focused on the 
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delivery and uptake of the intervention components, and our findings suggest the 
programme was largely feasible, accessible and acceptable. We provide a plausible 
explanation for why some of the intervention’s intended outcomes were achieved in the 
trial, while others were not. We also highlight that while microfinance holds great promise 
as a mechanism for achieving health gains in marginalised populations, finding optimal 
models for delivering combined microfinance and health promotion will require 
operational research and ongoing innovation. 
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Tables and Figures 
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Table 1: The IMAGE Intervention 
Component Key features 
Poverty-
focused 
microfinance 
Facilitated by one SEF fieldworker in each village and comprising: 
- Identification of the poorest households using participatory 
wealth ranking[20] 
- Recruitment and group formation for mutual credit guarantee 
and support (one group = 5 women) 
- Individual borrowing and repayment of loans over 10/20 week 
cycles 
- Fortnightly centre meetings (one centre comprises 
approximately 40 women in 8 groups) 
- Ongoing business assessment and impact monitoring 
 
SEF staffing was in line with staffing across the whole organisation. 
Three fieldstaff and one branch manager worked on IMAGE during the 
trial and a further eight fieldstaff and one manager during scale-up. 
 SFL gender 
and HIV/AIDS 
awareness 
training 
SFL was developed and initially managed by RADAR, Witwatersrand, 
University. A team of SFL trainers work across many villages to 
conduct ten sessions within fortnightly SEF centre meetings over 
approximately 6 months.  
1. Introductions 
2. Reflecting on Culture 
3. Gender Roles 
4. Women’s Work 
5. Our Bodies, Our Selves 
6. Domestic Violence 
7. Gender and HIV 
8. Knowledge is Power 
9. Empowering Change 
10. Way Forward 
 
A team of four trainers delivered SFL and CM during the trial, 
expanding to ten during scale-up. 
Support for CM Following completion of SFL, these activities are also led by SFL 
trainers  
- Election of ‘natural leaders’ from within centres (up to 5 per 
centre) 
- External training for NL 
- Development of centre-based action plans responding to local 
priority issues 
- Six-to-nine months of continued facilitation by SFL trainers, 
decreasing over time  
 
SEF=Small Enterprise Foundation, RADAR=Rural AIDS and Development Action Research Programme, SFL=Sisters for 
Life, CM=Community Mobilisation, NL=Natural Leader.
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Figure: Timeline of research and delivery of IMAGE intervention in rural South Africa 2001-2007  
 
0
1000
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3000
4000
Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07
IMAGE Trial Phase Scale-up phase
(a) Timing of Data Collection modules 
(b) Number of microfinance clients accessing SFL training
Field staff 
interviews (cyclical)
Participant observation and diaries
Client FGDs
Dropout 
interviews
Trial client 
interviews 
(retrospective)
Manager interviews 
(cyclical)Detailed attendance registers
Structured 2-
year follow up 
interviews
Scale-up 
client 
interviews
 
Key: The figure shows the timing of data collection modules (grey boxes) and the cumulative enrolment of 
microfinance clients to SFL training (black line) over a seven year period 2001-2007. FGD – Focus Group Discussion. 
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Table 2: Sociodemographic profile of IMAGE clients, drop-outs, consistent-attenders and NLs and responses to IMAGE 
 
Characteristic Grouping 
 
All recruited clients 
 
Programme drop-out 
by 2 years 
Attended more than 7 
SFL sessions 
Became a “natural 
leader” 
Age group Under 35 years 116 (27.1%) 53/103 (51.5%)* 60/104 (57.7%)* 7/103 (6.8%)* 
35-44 years 154 (36.0%) 45/138 (32.6%)* 93/147 (63.3%)* 21/139 (15.1%)* 
More than 44 years 158 (36.9%) 36/143 (25.2%)* 111/155 (71.6%)* 9/142 (6.3%)* 
Marital status Never married 104 (24.4%) 40/93 (43.0%) 54/96 (56.3%) 7/94 (7.4%) 
Currently married 187 (43.9%) 52/167 (31.1%) 126/175 (72.0%) 14/167 (8.4%) 
Separated/divorced 48 (11.3%) 15/44 (34.1%) 32/48 (66.7%) 7/43 (16.3%) 
Widowed 87 (20.4%) 27/79 (34.2%) 52/86 (60.5%) 9/79 (11.4%) 
Wealth status Poorest 246 (57.6%) 73/223 (32.7%) 162/238 (68.1%) 26/223 (11.7%) 
Less poor 181 (42.4%) 61/161 (37.9%) 102/167 (61.1%) 11/161 (6.8%) 
Education None/primary 263 (61.7%) 69/238 (29.0%) 168/252 (66.7%) 17/238 (7.1%) 
Attended secondary 131 (30.8%) 53/118 (44.9%) 75/123 (61.0%) 17/118 (14.4%) 
Completed secondary 32 (7.5%) 11/27 (40.7%) 20/29 (69.0%) 3/27 (11.1%) 
Number of 
children 
0-2 104 (24.5%) 41/90 (45.6%) 60/95 (63.2%) 7/90 (7.8%) 
3/4 92 (21.6%) 34/82 (41.5%) 51/87 (58.6%) 12 /82 (14.6%) 
5 or more 229 (53.9%) 50/202 (24.8%) 153/222 (68.9%) 18 /210 (8.6%) 
Household 
head 
No 270 (62.8%) 87/237 (36.7%) 163/249 (65.5%) 18 /238 (7.6%) 
Yes 160 (37.2%) 47/147 (32.0%) 101/157 (64.3%) 19 /146 (13.0%) 
 
Key: Denominator changes slightly owing to missing data. * represents significantly different profiles between sociodemographic groups (Chi2 p<0.05). 
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Table 3: Indicators of acceptability of SFL and CM 
 
Statement N I Strongly 
agree 
I Agree I disagree I strongly 
disagree 
The trainers were well informed and knew a lot about 
the subjects 373 327 (87.7%) 40 (10.7%) 2 (0.5%) 4 (1.1%) 
I felt uncomfortable with some of the topics  
373 28 (7.5%) 30 (8.0%) 165 (44.2%) 150 (40.2%) 
I felt like I had the chance to participate and ask 
questions if I wanted to  373 182 (48.8%) 124 (33.2%) 53 (14.2%) 14 (3.8%) 
I learned nothing new 
373 38 (10.2%) 25 (6.7%) 133 (35.7%) 177 (47.5%) 
The training has had a major impact on my life  
373 255 (68.4%) 91 (24.4%) 15 (4.0%) 12 (3.2%) 
I often spoke of what I learned in the training to family 
and friends outside of the meetings  374 282 (75.4%) 71 (19.0%) 14 (3.7%) 7 (1.9%) 
The people in my loan group support me when I am 
having problems  378 249 (65.9%) 88 (23.3%) 17 (4.5%) 24 (6.3%) 
I was active in trying to formulate and do an “action 
plan” with my centre  376 189 (50.3%) 137 (36.4%) 45 (12.0%) 5 (1.3%) 
I participated in the activities organised by my centre in 
our village and local area  376 182 (48.4%) 108 (28.7%) 79 (21.0%) 7 (1.9%) 
I think my centre was successful in trying to change 
things in our village through its action plans  373 209 (56.0%) 129 (34.6%) 26 (7.0%) 9 (2.4%) 
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